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This paper describes the generation and simulation process of computational models oriented to the 
analysis of the operational situations (OPSIT) of anti-air warfare (AAW) and antisubmarine warfare 
(ASW), with the purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of different combinations of threats, weapons, 
and sensors of the Colombian Navy. A detailed description of the OPSITs modeling process is presented 
by using the selected discrete events simulation tool. The experiments design process and the statistical 
analysis of the results is also described, using a statistical analysis tool. All this to provide the Colombian 
Navy with a tool it can use to evaluate the systems that could be part of future units.
El documento describe el proceso de generación y simulación de modelos computacionales orientados 
hacia el análisis de unas situaciones operacionales de guerra antiaérea (AAW) y Antisubmarina (ASW), 
con el fin de evaluar la efectividad de diferentes combinaciones de amenazas, armas y sensores de la 
Marina Colombiana. Se presenta una descripción detallada del proceso de modelación de las situaciones 
operacionales en la herramienta de simulación de eventos discretos seleccionada, así como también se 
describe el proceso de diseño de los experimentos y el tratamiento estadístico de los resultados, empleando 
una herramienta de análisis estadístico. Lo anterior tendiente a proporcionar a la Armada Colombiana, 
una herramienta para la evaluación de los sistemas que podrían componer las futuras unidades.
Key words: Simulation, discrete events, modeling, antisubmarine warfare, anti-air warfare, experiment 
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Simulation tools allow modeling phenomena 
or events of different complexity and are used 
as support tools in the decision making process 
because they base their predictions on mathematical 
methods that yield results that are very close to the 
real ones. In fact, simulation can be defined as the 
act of imitating a real system, representing certain 
characteristics or its behavior.
This document seeks to describe the process of 
generating and simulating computational models 
of antisubmarine (ASW) and anti-aircraft warfare 
(AAW) by using discrete event simulation. The 
aim of the development of such models is to use 
them as tools for conceptual exploration of future 
units to evaluate the effectiveness of different 
weapons system configurations considered at this 
stage. That means that these models will be other 
tools to optimize processes of conceptual design of 
units afloat.
The methodology used to develop the models 
begins with the selection of operational situations 
to simulate, then it is necessary to identify the 
different threats, weapons, and sensors and their 
possible combinations within the selected scenario; 
this is introduced to the selected simulation tool 
and results obtained will undergo statistical 
processing to successfully analyze them.
Some key concepts related to this topic are presented 
to provide tools to improve understanding of the 
paper.
Discrete Event Simulation
Discrete event simulation is a computer technique 
for dynamic systems modeling. In this type of 
simulation, events are generated and managed 
over time using an event queue ordered by the 
simulation time in which events must occur, thus, 
the simulator can read the queue and trigger new 
events.
Operational situation (OPSIT)
Operational situations are the scenarios used as 
base for evaluating different configurations of 
weapons, sensors, and threats for both ASW and 
AAW.
To select OPSITs that will be simulated, it was 
necessary to gather a group of experts in ASW, 
which comprised ASW officers and petty officers 
from ARC Almirante Padilla type frigates of the 
Colombian Navy and for a submarine warfare 
expert from the Colombian submarine fleet. For 
AAW, it was possible to obtain technical advice 
from an officer from DARET and an officer who is 
studying in the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).
For ASW the publication MXP-1 (D) (Navy) (Air) 
of the U.S. Navy (Multi-National Submarine and 
Anti-Submarine Exercise Manual) was taken as 
reference from which two operational scenarios 
were selected among several proposed. For ASW, 
the OPSITs selected are:
1. Port leaving with submarine opposition. 
(Similar to Casex C-7)
2. Coordinated submarine search in an area.
The configuration of each OPSIT depends on the 
specific need to be evaluated. For cases presented 
in this document, the units involved in the first 
OPSIT are: two ships (with Helicopters), one 
tanker (main body), and one submarine.
In the second OPSIT had: one ship (with helicopter) 
and one submarine.
The first OPSIT mission is the main body 
protection and neutralization of the threat, while 
for the second OPSIT, the only objective is to 
neutralize the threat.
Fig. 1 provides an overview of the AAW OPSIT, 
showing enemy aircraft in red and the unit attacked 
is in the center in blue. In this case, the unit’s 
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fundamental mission is to defend itself against the 
attacks.
For AAW, the OPSIT was basically modeled as 
missile air defense, where a ship is the target of 
a coordinated enemy aircraft attack, using air-
surface missiles (ASM).
In order to have metrics to evaluate each mission, 
some requirements have been designed to determine 
its success, based on the calculation of measures of 
performance (MOP) and a measure of effectiveness 
(MOE) for each OPSIT.
The measure of effectiveness is defined by the 
weighted sum of the measures of performance 
established; that is:
Where W1, W2, Wn  are factors representing the 
importance of each MOP. For ASW, these values 
were determined from surveys made in that regard 
to two of the commanders of Almirante Padilla 
type frigates of the Colombian navy.
In the ASW OPSIT, the MOPs are:
•	 MOP1 = Tanker survival probability
•	 MOP2 = Survival probability of the ships
•	 MOP3 = Threat neutralizing probability
And the MOE of this OPSIT is:
For the second ASW OPSIT, the MOPs are:
•	 MOP1 = Survival probability of ships
•	 MOP2 = Threat neutralizing probability
•	 MOP3 = Time to detect the submarine
And the MOE of this OPSIT is:
Finally, for the AAW OPSIT, the MOP is equal 
to the MOE; due to this, only one MOP will be 
evaluated:
•	 MOP1 = Survival probability of ships
And the MOE is:
The AAW OPSIT takes into account three possible 
threats. Bear in mind that for this particular case, 
ASM missiles and not the planes are assumed as 
direct threats, given the assumption that a plane 
is not going to approach within the range of the 
ship guns.
Data presented in Table 1 are some of the features 
of the threats selected.
Mission Evaluation
Threat Characterization
Fig. 1. Panorama of the AAW OPSIT
Table 1. AAW OPSIT threats characteristics
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Threat Characteristics Values
MISSILE 1
Speed 0.88 Match
Range 62 MN
RCS 0.2 m
Shooting 
distance 60 MN
Final phase 
height 18 ft
Vertical plane response of a ship on irregular seas 
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MISSILE 2
Speed 2.5 Match
Range 27 MN
RCS 0.1 m
Shooting 
distance 25 MN
Final phase 
height 15 ft
MISSILE 3
Speed 0.93 Match
Range 36 MN
RCS 0.2 m
Shooting 
distance 35 MN
Final phase 
height 9 ft
Both ASW OPSITs take into account two possible 
threats. The general characteristics of the two 
submarines, which are relevant to the appropriate 
development of the models, are presented in Table 2.
It is worth stating that the selection of the threat 
and its operating characteristics are subject to 
change, depending on the needs of the situation.
For the ASW OPSITs, the technological weapons 
and sensors options taken into account are 
presented in Table 3.
For the AAW OPSIT, configurations of the ship 
weapons and sensors that will be evaluated in the 
simulation are shown in Table 4 and technological 
options taken into account appear in Table 5.
Table 2. ASW OPSITs threats characteristics
Table 3. ASW Technological Options
Submarine 1 Submarine 2
Sonar:
STN Atlas 
DBQS40 
sonar suite:
detection sonar
Integrated Lira 
system, incorporating 
the hydrophones 
horseshoe and flank 
arrays; 
Torpedo:
12 [ maximum 
speed 35 kt; 
range 28 km at 
24 kt; 12 km 
at 35 kt]
18 [Speed: 30-50 
kt, Range: 27 n 
miles/13.5 n miles]
Missile: Optional. 10 VLS cells.
Counter-
measures:
Defense system 
Tau torpedoes N/A.-
Speed:
12 kt (surface) 
20 kt 
(submerged)
10 kt (surface) 19 kt 
(submerged)
Technological 
Options Variable
Hull sonar
Option 1 Frequency: (4.5 kHz)Power: 96 kW 
Option 2 Frequency: (7. 5 kHz)Power: 36 kW
VDS
Option 1 Frequency: (12 kHz)
Option 2 Frequency: (5 kHz)Power: 96 kW(peak)
TAS
Option 1 Frequency: (< =1 kHz)
Option 2 Frequency: (< =1 kHz)
Ship 
torpedo
Option 1 Speed: 28 ktRange: 13.5 Km
Option 2 Speed: 29 ktRange: 23 Km
Option 3 Speed: 45 ktRange: 11.11 Km 
ASW Helo.
Option 1 
(8 sonobuoys 
1Torpedo)
Autonomy: 1.4 
Hours
Torpedo: Option 2
Option 2
(VDS 
1Torpedo)
Autonomy: 2 Hours
Torpedo Option 1
Range:
8,000 Mn at 
8 kt (surface); 
420 Mn at 8 
kt (submerged)
6,000 Mn at 7 kt 
(surface); 650 n miles 
at 3 kt (submerged)
Operational 
depth: 700 m 300 m
Technological Options
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Table 4. Ship configuration options
Table 5. AAW technological options
Radar ESM SAM CANNON CWIS ECM CHAFF
Config. 1 Opt. 1 Opt. 1 Opt. 2 Opt. 1 and 2 NO Opt. 1 Opt. 1
Config. 2 Opt. 2 Opt. 2 Opt. 1 Opt. 1 and 2 NO NO Opt. 2
Options Characterístics Values
SENSORS
Radar
Option 1
Maximum Theoretical Range 10.79 MN 
Antimissile probability 80%
Option 2
Maximum Theoretical Range 10.79 MN 
Antimissile probability 80%
ESM
Option 1
Sensitivity -75 dBm
Minimum Frequency 1 GHz
Maximum Frequency 18 GHz
Option 2
Sensitivity -65 dBm
Minimum Frequency 0.5 GHz
Maximum Frequency 40 GHz
WEAPONS
SAM
Option 1
Range 8.09 MN 
Speed 2.5 Match
Impact probability 30%
Minimum distance 0.4 MN
Option 2
Range 8.09 MN 
Speed 2.5 Match
Impact probability 30%
Minimum distance 0.4 MN
CANNONS Option 1
Caliber 127 mm
Shots per minute 40
Effective range 16.19 MN 
Minimum distance 0.3 MN
Vertical plane response of a ship on irregular seas 
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WEAPONS
CANNONS
Option 2
Caliber 40 mm
Shots per minute 300
Effective range 3.2 MN
Minimum distance 0.3 MN
Option 3
Caliber 76 mm
Shots per minute 120
Effective range 16.19 MN 
Minimum distance 0.3 MN
Option 4
Caliber 20 mm
Shots per minute 450
Effective range 1.07 MN
Minimum distance 0.2 MN
ECM Option 1
Reaction time 1 sec
Simultaneous threats Yes
CHAFF
Option 1
Cloud time 40 sec
Fake target size 10,000 m2
IR Signature yes
Option 2
Cloud time 40 sec
Fake target size 10,000 m2
IR Signature yes
To make the OPSITs models in the simulation tool 
it was necessary to develop a logic diagram to have 
greater clarity on the logical relationships among 
the different processes occurring in each. Fig. 2 
presents one example.
The general scheme for the development of 
simulation models is presented in Fig. 3.
Endogenous variables that constitute the inputs or 
the simulation model are on the left side of Fig. 3; 
the state variables, which condition the simulation 
process, are on the central part, and – finally – the 
exogenous variables as result of the process are in 
the right side of the figure.
Then, the modeling process begins in the simulator. 
An example of the blocks created in the simulator 
is presented in Fig. 4 (see pag. 36).
For the AAW OPSIT, the model starts with the 
creation of a couple of objects, which will be 
necessary for assigned properties, these properties 
are read from an Excel spreadsheet that has all the 
values needed for the model to function. Once 
read, these properties are stored in the object in 
form of attributes.
Simulation Models
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Fig. 2. Logical diagram for variable initialization of AAW OPSIT 
Fig. 3. General diagram of the simulation process
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Fig. 4. AAW ship sensor model in the simulator
When each object has its attributes, it is necessary to 
calculate whether threats are within the detection 
range of each sensor. If threats are within range, 
the sensor determines the distance and sends 
the information to a queue of weapons that will 
assign the appropriate defense (defense of barriers 
concept); otherwise, the sensor will continue 
sweeping the area until achieving detection.
In general, the AAW model block presented in 
Fig. 4 was used to simulate the dynamic approach 
(simulation sampling) of enemy missiles fired. 
When these missiles are within range of the 
sensors, detection occurs. This detection activates 
a weapons assignment queue, which is another 
object or event in the simulation.
Likewise, all OPSIT threats were modeled in the 
simulator. The activation of each threat constitutes 
an event in the simulation. For the AAW OPSIT, 
the specific threats are ASM missiles; therefore, 
these were modeled in the simulator, as shown in 
Fig. 5.
For the case shown in Fig. 5, the simulation begins 
with the activation of each threat in the Excel 
spreadsheet. The model loads the properties of each 
missile, which are read from the Excel spreadsheet 
that has all the values needed to run the simulation. 
Once the properties have been read, they are stored 
in the object (an object for each threat) in the form 
of attributes.
Subsequently, the algorithm that allows:
•	 Calculate the path of the trajectory of the 
missile's towards the vessel.
•	 Activate the missile radar when is located at a 
specified distance from the ship.
•	 Activate the missile’s Electronic Counter-
Countermeasures systems (ECCM). 
•	 Placing missiles in the final height, stipulated 
in the Excel document.
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Fig. 5. Threats simulator model
Finally, the algorithm receives from the weapons 
queue the weapons assignment, the missile 
deactivation order, in case this was shot down by 
the weapon system.
To define the configurations of the experiments 
to be run in the discrete event simulator, it was 
necessary to perform an experimental design for 
which we used the JMP software, a tool for data 
statistical analysis.
Basically, the process consists of introducing 
the variable names that will result from the 
experiments, which in this case are the MOP raised 
on initial sections for each OPSIT and, factors that 
intervene in the experiments, which in this case 
are the different sensors and weapons selected for 
evaluation.
Once we have the necessary data, the experimental 
design is generated and a list of data is obtained 
for each experiment. Each experiment is run the 
necessary number of times to obtain acceptable 
statistical data.
For the first ASW OPSIT, the resulting design of 
experiments is 18, which means that it is possible 
to evaluate 18 possible scenarios. For each of them, 
Table 6 presents its measures of performance. In 
the second ASW OPSIT, the software showed that 
30 experiments would be needed. The results of 
MOP for this scenario are presented in Table 7.
Finally, for the AAW OPSIT, six experiments 
were made, considering the two specific vessel 
configurations of sensors and weapons that were 
shown in Table 5, only varying the threat.
The results for this MOP scenario are shown in 
Table 8.
For these OPSITs, the reliability of the models 
simulated was evaluated in the statistical analysis 
software and the relative importance of each 
variable in each configuration was verified.
Experimental Design and Results
Table 6. ASW OPSIT1 Experiment Design Results 
Experiment MOP 2 MOP 1 MOP 3
1 27.60% 28.30% 0.00%
2 43.30% 44.40% 54.40%
3 30.85% 30.70% 28.60%
4 41.10% 40.20% 50.30%
5 27.45% 27.50% 0.70%
6 43.85% 44.50% 49.40%
7 34.50% 34.20% 26.40%
8 27.85% 28.70% 0.00%
9 33.95% 33.90% 30.00%
10 40.65% 41.30% 21.70%
11 31.25% 31.60% 24.90%
12 44.50% 43.90% 21.30%
Vertical plane response of a ship on irregular seas 
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13 49.50% 49.10% 49.10%
14 28.35% 29.50% 4.00%
15 50.00% 52.30% 45.50%
16 43.85% 43.40% 50.40%
17 36.30% 38.00% 0.00%
18 38.40% 37.50% 0.00%
Table 7. ASW OPSIT2 Experiment Design Results
Fig 6. ASW OPSIT 1 Pareto Plot of MOP2
Experiment MOP 1 MOP 2
MOP 3 
(Min)
1 25.00% 12.40% 2453.253
2 84.48% 63.14% 912.747
3 32.10% 16.26% 2305.71
4 59.36% 42.38% 1525.92
5 83.10% 62.46% 973.896
6 49.74% 26.22% 2065.041
7 52.72% 31.72% 1912.449
8 50.64% 28.44% 2003.331
9 32.12% 15.36% 2367.981
10 50.64% 28.44% 2003.331
11 75.46% 54.44% 1205.028
12 70.12% 51.12% 1275.153
13 48.90% 32.96% 1808.103
14 52.96% 31.24% 1924.791
15 15.14% 3.24% 2703.459
16 75.96% 56.44% 1162.953
17 69.56% 50.28% 1306.008
18 55.42% 32.28% 1828.86
19 49.88% 37.84% 1739.661
20 49.88% 27.44% 2030.259
21 70.94% 54.38% 1170.246
22 73.32% 49.88% 1440.648
23 85.28% 65.20% 908.259
24 56.96% 32.88% 1809.225
25 50.86% 39.14% 1702.074
26 48.74% 24.70% 2107.677
27 51.92% 29.92% 1962.378
28 83.74% 59.62% 1075.437
29 75.58% 56.56% 1153.416
30 66.94% 50.92% 1271.226
The analysis of variance results provided by the 
software allows having a high level of confidence 
on the statistical model because correlation 
coefficients were obtained between 0.88 and 0.99, 
meaning that the models in the discrete event 
simulator produce consistent data.
Considering the results presented in the Pareto 
plots, similar to what is presented in Fig. 6 for 
both ASW OPSITs, it was possible to note that at 
least 45% of the variability of the model depends 
on the presence or absence of helicopters. Also, it 
was clear the relevance the VDS/TAS-type sensor 
has; in fact, at least 18% of the variability of the 
model depended on the lack of these sensors on the 
platform.
The results obtained from the AAW simulation 
model, for characteristics raised in each experiment, 
show that configuration 1 has the best performance, 
given that it can attend all missiles simultaneously. 
This is a significant advantage, given that it reduces 
weapons reallocating dependence. Similarly, the 
weapons range of configuration 1 is higher than 
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Table 8. AAW OPSIT experimental design results 
Missile 1 Missile 2 Missile 3
Config. 1 17% 39% 60%
Config. 1 14% 32% 44%
the weapons range of the other configuration, 
allowing saving time during the defense process.
Regarding threats, missile 2 showed that because 
of its high speed, the probability of survival of 
the platform to which it is confronted is greatly 
reduced and, in some cases, weapons systems are 
completely ineffective against this threat, given 
that the highest probability of survival obtained at 
the end of the simulations does not exceed 20% in 
any case.
With the tactical situations presented in the 
paper, it was possible to evaluate the relationships 
between weapons and sensors systems, which allow 
inferring that with a common configuration of 
weapons and sensors, it will be possible to evaluate 
tactical situations that ultimately lead to a study of 
doctrine or tactical procedures, using these same 
models.
The models structured have high flexibility to 
adapt to any type of analysis; these could be about 
threats or configuration of the platforms. Excel 
interfaces facilitate data input process and final 
statistics.
Also, it was possible to observe, through the 
experimentation process, that a strong relationship 
exists between the sensor and weapon selected, i.e., 
it is not possible to obtain the expected results when 
the features of one of the two exceeds the other 
because it is not significant to have a sensor with 
a long range, if the weapon used cannot neutralize 
the threat detected.
Finally, it is important to note that the results 
obtained from the simulation of these models 
allow validating these methods; however, these are 
not convincing to make decisions on what is the 
best configuration because too much of the data 
or characterizations of the weapons, sensors, and 
threats provided to the model were speculative 
due to the absence of information available in 
the market. This implies that upon making the 
analysis of real equipment that could be installed 
in future ships; it is necessary for sensors and 
weapons manufacturers to provide the necessary 
information to perform an analysis that could help 
to conclude about the best configuration.
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